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Regulatory approaches for cyber security of
critical infrastructures: The case of Turkey
Bilge Karabacak *, Sevgi Ozkan Yildirim, Nazife Baykal
Graduate School of Informatics, Middle East Technical University, Universiteler Mah., Ankara, Turkey
A B S T R A C T
Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare and/or national
security of countries. Today, cyber systems are extensively used to control and monitor criti-
cal infrastructures. A considerable amount of the infrastructures are connected to the Internet
over corporate networks. Therefore, cyber security is an important item for the national se-
curity agendas of several countries. The enforcement of security principles on the critical
infrastructure operators through the regulations is a still-debated topic. There are several
academic and governmental studies that analyze the possible regulatory approaches for the
security of the critical infrastructures. Although most of them favor the market-oriented
approaches, some argue the necessity of government interventions. This paper presents a
three phased-research to identify the suitable regulatory approach for the critical infra-
structures of Turkey. First of all, the data of the critical infrastructures of Turkey are qualitatively
analyzed, by using grounded theory method, to extract the vulnerabilities associated with
the critical infrastructures. Secondly, a Delphi survey is conducted with six experts to extract
the required regulations to mitigate the vulnerabilities. Finally, a focus group interview is
conducted with the employees of the critical infrastructures to specify the suitable regu-
latory approaches for the critical infrastructures of Turkey. The results of the research show
that the critical infrastructure operators of Turkey, including privately held operators, are
mainly in favor of regulations.













Any physical or cyber infrastructure is called a critical infra-
structure if damage to that infrastructure will have a harmful
effect on the economy, social order and/or national security
of a country (USA, 2001). The term “critical infrastructure” was
first used by the Executive Order of President of United States
in 1996 (The White House, 1996). The executive order under-
lined two types of threats against critical infrastructures:
physical and cyber threats.
Cyber space has been growing wider with every passing day
through the participation of organizations and individuals all
over the world into it. Along with the growth of cyber space,
the probability of abuses by malicious users, groups, and even
states increases as well (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010). Until
now, a number of cyber attacks against critical infrastruc-
tures like nuclear plants, electrical grids, sewing infrastructures,
flight control systems and harbors have been reported (Condron,
2007; Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011). Malicious actors have been
increasing their capabilities to acquire asymmetrical results
on their behalf (Friedman, 2013). Asymmetrical cyber threats
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may cause serious harm to a critical infrastructure of a country
at really low costs. No critical infrastructure in cyber space is
untouchable, regardless of the country it belongs to. As a matter
of fact, critical infrastructures of developed countries are more
prone to the impact of cyber threats, as technological infra-
structure of those countries are more prevalent and
sophisticated (Clarke and Knake, 2012).
Today, cyber threats are some sort of a national security
problem (Svete, 2012). Struggling with cyber threats requires
large-scale efforts, which are organized by states and sus-
tained through the cooperation among national actors
(Nissenbaum, 2005). The practical reflection of those large-
scale efforts is the inclusion of the cyber threats in the national
security strategies of the countries (Robinson et al., 2013).Thus,
critical infrastructure protection is one of the most impor-
tant chapters of the national infrastructure strategies.
Ensuring cyber resilience of critical infrastructures is a promi-
nent and difficult part of the national security efforts of
countries (Young, 2012). The difficulties stem not only from the
peculiarities of the cyber threats, but also from the critical in-
frastructure ownerships. Critical infrastructures are mostly
owned and operated by private entities in developed coun-
tries. For example, the percentage of the private sector
ownership of the infrastructures in the US was 85% eight years
ago (de Bruijne and van Eeten, 2007). Therefore, the security
of the non-state actors such as the private sector is closely
related to national security in the digital era, which was not
the case before (Andress, 2003).
The enforcement of security rules on critical infrastruc-
ture operators is a part of cyber resiliency efforts of countries.
There are a couple of models, from market provision to gov-
ernment ownership, for critical infrastructure protection (Assaf,
2008). Strong government supervision on critical infrastruc-
tures for cyber resilience may seem trivial at first sight; however,
it is a challenging issue for the governments of developed coun-
tries due to power and lobbying of private sector. Therefore,
critical infrastructure protection is one of the most controver-
sial aspects of national security domain because of the
superiority of private sector in the ownership of infrastructures.
The number of academic studies that are about regula-
tory approaches on critical infrastructures is limited. Current
studies are generally done by academics in developed demo-
cratic countries and they put non-regulatory notions like
cooperation and innovation above regulations. It is under-
lined that collaboration of public and private entities in cyber
security is important for national security (Hansen and
Nissenbaum, 2009). The participation of non-state actors like
private sector and even individuals in national cyber security
concepts is a new phenomenon for decision makers (Brechbühl
et al., 2010; NCAFP, 2013; Mitchell, 2013; Stavridis and Farkas,
2012). Although the idea of non-regulation has gained wider
acceptance in developed countries, there are still clear objec-
tions to that idea by some security experts and government
officials (Wikipedia Contributors, 2015).
Cyber systems are used significantly in the energy, tele-
communications, finance, government services, transportation,
and water management sectors in Turkey. In spite of the recent
national efforts, critical infrastructures of Turkey have still sig-
nificant vulnerabilities that make systems prone to cyber
threats. The principal author of this article made a PhD re-
search that covered cyber security of the critical infrastructures
of Turkey. In the PhD research, through grounded theory
method, the root causes of the susceptibility of the critical in-
frastructures to cyber threats are extracted by an analysis of
the data of a state-sponsored project. Secondly, the set of cyber
security principles are specified through the use of expert
opinion in a five-phased Delphi survey. Seven of the prin-
ciples are the regulations on the cyber security of the critical
infrastructures. Thirdly, the regulatory approaches for those
regulations are determined by conducting a focus group in-
terview with nine employees of critical infrastructure operators
from six different critical sectors. Thirdly, part of the re-
search is performed after the completion of the PhD research
as a follow-up study.
The outcomes of focus group interviews demonstrated that
critical infrastructure operators of Turkey support cyber secu-
rity regulations. The representatives of the private energy firm,
the telecommunications and finance sectors stated that regu-
lations ensure an acceptable level of security that is formed
by the participation of all operators in a critical sector. They
also pointed out that the operators should express their opin-
ions on the processes, engage more in the determination of
the regulations, and concur with the regulatory agency. The re-
maining operators in the sector, which were all public,
emphasized the guidance of regulations. They stated that their
roles and responsibilities should be defined by laws and regu-
lations so that the managers can allocate sufficient budget and
manpower for the purpose.
Turkey has a considerable amount of private operators es-
pecially in finance, telecommunications and energy sectors.
Because the majority of the current academic studies cover the
cases of the developed countries, they mainly argue the im-
portance of market oriented approaches. In this regard, we
believe that our study has some unique findings that are the
reflection of a peculiar situation of Turkey. Those findings also
confirm that there is no unique approach to regulatory ap-
proaches for critical infrastructures’ cyber security.
The article is organized as follows: The recent discussions
on the approaches of cyber security regulation toward criti-
cal infrastructures are summarized in the next section.The third
section touches upon the legislative and organizational struc-
tures of Turkey. The fourth section is dedicated to the details
and findings of the three-phased research process. The fifth
section is allocated for the discussions of the results. The sixth
section is for the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations
part of the research. The last section is dedicated to future re-
search implications.
2. Hot topic of the developed world:
regulation or innovation?
There are two perspectives on the regulation of the critical in-
frastructures in terms of cyber security. This situation can
sometimes be viewed as a dilemma for the governments
(Orlowski, 2001). On one side, some security experts and gov-
ernment officials think that regulations are imperative to protect
the critical infrastructures. On the other side, private sector ex-
ecutives claim that regulations are the obstacles in front of the
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innovations in cyber security. Executives assert that we should
cooperate instead of regulate.The disputes increase in line with
the infrastructure ownership of the private sector.
The dilemma was experienced in the proposal of the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 in the US. The original version of the
act imposed mandatory security standards on critical infra-
structure owners. It also involved information sharing with the
military. The private sector criticized the proposal for these ob-
ligations. As a result of the critiques, the proposal was altered
to reflect changes as the voluntary participation of the private
sector and stronger government incentives (Hiller and Russell,
2013). In spite of these changes in favor of the private sector,
the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 failed to pass the US Senate, al-
though it was endorsed by the White House (Kelly, 2012). After
the dispute of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, Executive Order
13636 was released by the White House in February 2013 (The
White House, 2013). The title of the EO was “Improving Criti-
cal Infrastructure Cybersecurity”. The main theme of the EO
was to increase the public–private partnership. It assigned duties
to federal agencies in sharing cyber threat information with
the private sector, in coordination with the critical infrastruc-
ture owners and in collaboratively developing and implementing
risk-based approaches to cyber security (DHS, 2013).
According to the current EU rules, among all critical sectors,
only telecommunications sector has to adopt security mea-
sures and report significant security incidents to the
government bodies (European Commission, 2013b). EU is on
the way to impose government provisions on several critical
infrastructure sectors of the member countries. On February
2013, European Commission prepared a proposal for a direc-
tive “concerning measures to ensure a high common level of
network and information security across the Union” (European
Commission, 2013a). If it is approved by the European Council
and Parliament, Member States will have to implement the di-
rective within 18 months (European Commission, 2013b). As
the strongest motive of its latest proposal, the European Com-
mission reminds the previous cyber security gaps that resulted
from the voluntary nature of the past efforts. If the proposal
is approved, critical infrastructure operators (from the sectors
ranging from energy to healthcare) and public administra-
tors will be required to assess the risks they face and to adopt
appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure network and
information security. These entities will also be required to
report incidents with a significant impact on the core ser-
vices provided for competent authorities (European
Commission, 2013a). As a result, the directive will apply to the
critical infrastructures owned by the private sector as well (Hiller
and Russell, 2013).
Hiller and Russell state that countries struggle to find the
best strategy and regulation for the critical infrastructures
owned by the private sector (Hiller and Russell, 2013). The
authors compare the approaches of the US and the EU in terms
of the cyber security rules on the private sector. According to
the authors, the US follows a voluntary approach for the private
sector, whereas the EU adopts a relatively mandatory ap-
proach. This conclusion confirms the latest developments in
the US and EU.
The approach of Australia resembles the approach of the
US. According to Wilson, the Australian government has a de-
liberate non-regulatory approach for CIP. The liability of the
protection of the infrastructure is left to the owners of the in-
frastructures (Wilson, 2014). The legal situation is the same for
the Australian National Broadband Network, the largest infra-
structure project in Australian history. There is no security
strategy associated with the national broadband network.
Instead of the government rules for the protection of the in-
frastructures, public–private partnerships, as a cost-effective
partnering with non-government organizations, would produce
positive outcomes for cyber resilience (Cook, 2010).
Dunn-Cavelty and Suter emphasize the importance self-
regulating and self-organizing networks for the CIP policy.They
argue that the role of the government should be far from close
supervision and immediate control; rather, the government
should coordinate and motivate these networks for the CIP
tasks. In their article, they contrast the neoliberal gover-
nance theory and the network governance approach and argue
that neoliberal governance theory is not suitable for the security-
focused CIP policy since its focus is efficiency rather than
security.
Assaf does not see the regulation issue of the critical in-
frastructures as a dilemma. Rather, he considers it a choice of
governments. For him, there are two basic models for CIP: the
national security model and the business continuity model
(Assaf, 2008). Assaf shares an illuminating regulatory con-
tinuum to demonstrate the seven different options: from the
highest government intervention to the lowest. The regula-
tory approaches from highest government intervention to the
lowest are listed as follows:
1) Government ownership
2) Command and control
3) Delegation to agency




Assaf compares the US and Israel in terms of their govern-
mental interventions in cyber security regulations of critical
infrastructures. The US adopts the business continuity model
with the exceptions in energy and chemistry sectors, whereas
Israel adopts the national security model.
According to Luiijf and Klaver, no single governance model
for CIP is applicable to all countries. The regulation of CIP in
a country depends on its legal system, the trust level between
government and private sectors, and its historical and cul-
tural backgrounds (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004). Hence, Luiijf and
Klaver corroborate the idea of Assaf. Luiijf and Klaver also
mention the importance of the cooperation and collabora-
tion efforts in both national and international domains. They
also emphasize the internationally harmonized CIP efforts for
multinational operators.
Orlowski also points out the regulatory approaches for the
multinational infrastructures. According to Orlowski, there are
two types of regulations for the CIP: protective security and
criminal laws. Protective regulations should be the last resort
for the free market economies. Countries with such econo-
mies should cooperate instead of regulate because they may
impose different regulations on critical infrastructures accord-
ing to their constitutional powers. These differences result in
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inconsistencies at cross-border management, especially for mul-
tinational corporations. On the other hand, fighting against
cybercrime is a field where a commonly accepted regulation
is needed (Orlowski, 2001). Convention on Cybercrime, also
known as the Budapest Convention, is an international treaty
to fight against cybercrime by urging the harmonization of the
domestic laws (European Council, 2001). It was signed by 33
countries: 32 members of the European Council and the US.
Table 1 summarizes the provision approaches of three coun-
tries and the EU according to the articles reviewed. The US and
Australia adopt the market provision, which means minimum
supervision of the government. However, energy and chemis-
try sectors are more strictly supervised by the US federal
agencies. Israel adopts the government provision; that is, strict
supervision of the market by the government. EU recently at-
tempted to shift the paradigm from market to government
provision. However, as a result, the approaches on the CIP regu-
lation are a hot topic in the developed world. The strict
government intervention and regulations on the CIP efforts is
not considered as a suitable option by the academia and gov-
ernments of developed countries. A number of academic studies
that propose security management models for CIP originate
in such countries. This topic can be summarized by the fol-
lowing questions: Which is suitable? Regulation or Innovation?
These articles place the aspects like cooperation and innova-
tion above regulations.
3. Regulatory and organizational structures of
Turkey
In this section, the regulations of Turkey regarding cyber se-
curity and critical infrastructure sectors are reviewed.
First of all, Turkey has a civil legal system as opposed to the
US and the Commonwealth countries that have a common legal
system. In the civil legal system, the rules are written and struc-
tured in a hierarchy of norms. Courts give verdicts based on
the codes within this enormous hierarchy.
The statute 2011/2237 on Military Forbidden Zones and Se-
curity Zones mentions the requirements of the physical security
of energy, manufacturing, water management, transporta-
tion, telecommunications, intelligence, and military facilities,
without using the term critical infrastructure (Turkish Cabinet,
2011). The aforementioned statute does not include any ar-
ticles about the cyber security.
The Cyber Security Council of Turkey was established in
October 2012, with the members from eleven governmental or-
ganizations. After the second meeting of the council in June
2013, the telecommunications, energy, water management,
public services, transportation, and finance sectors were des-
ignated as national critical infrastructures of Turkey. However,
the decision remained in the minutes of the meeting, without
changing the existing regulations or creating a new one in
Turkey (Kaska and Trinberg, 2015).
Turkey has regulatory authorities for the energy, telecom-
munications and finance sectors. The related agencies are
autonomously managed.The government in office can appoint
only some members of the boards of these agencies. The water
management and transportation sectors do not have regulatory/
supervision agencies unlike the energy, telecommunication and
finance sectors. Therefore, these sectors are totally deprived
of sector-wide rules for physical and cyber aspects.
Until the amendments passed in December 2014, there were
no cyber security or information security-related articles in the
statutes of the energy sector.The Energy Market Regulatory Au-
thority amended the license regulations of the electricity, natural
gas, and petroleum markets in December 2014. According to
the amendments, electricity production, transmission, and dis-
tribution facilities, natural gas transmission and distribution
facilities, and petroleum refineries were required to establish
ISO 27001 compliant information security management systems
for their information processing departments (EMRA, 2014a;
EMRA, 2014b; EMRA, 2014c).
Publishing a legal annunciation, the Information and Com-
munication Technologies Authority urged the operators to
comply with ISO 27001 in the telecommunications sector in
October 2010. The authority released a new and more strin-
gent regulation for ISO 27001 compliance in July 2014 (ICTA,
2014). The statute of the Network and Information Security in
the Telecommunications Sector describes the details on the ex-
ternal and internal audit processes, required security
countermeasures and properties of the information systems
that should be set up by the operators as well.
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency published
several legislations for the finance sector. In January 2008, BSRA
published a legal annunciation on the information security
management of the banks. The annunciation contains the pro-
visions about information security risk management,
management liabilities, internal audit, outsourcing rules, sepa-
ration of the duties and several other controls (BRSA, 2007).
Another regulation sets the rules for the information systems
audits of the banks by the independent external auditors (BRSA,
2010).
In February 2014, the Electronic Communications Law was
amended to reflect the cabinet decisions dating back to October
2012 (Turkish Cabinet, 2014). By these amendments:
a) The Cyber Security Council was defined in ECL. The Min-
ister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications was
appointed as the president of the Cyber Security Council.
One of the responsibilities of the Cyber Security Council was
to approve the list of the critical infrastructures.
b) The cyber security roles of the Ministry of Transport,
Maritime Affairs and Communications (Ministry) were
defined. One of the responsibilities of the ministry was to
determine the critical infrastructures, their owners and
locations.










* Except for energy and chemistry sectors.
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As a critique of the Turkish organizational structure and the
legislation, it is possible to say that Turkey lacks an overarching
critical infrastructure protection program that handles cyber
and physical security together. By considering the establish-
ment of a security zone around the facilities, the decree 2011/
2237 considers only the physical security. The recent
amendments to the ECL assign some responsibilities to the Min-
istry and the Cyber Security Council only on cyber security.The
term “critical infrastructure” was used explicitly in the amend-
ments. However, the amendments hold neither a definition nor
a list of the critical infrastructures. Therefore, they are far from
setting up a holistic critical infrastructure protection program.
There is neither legislative nor organizational connection
between the decree 2011/2237 and the amendments to ECL.
The recent amendments to ECL assigned some roles to the
Ministry, but not the required authority. As an example, the
Ministry did not have the power to audit the public organiza-
tions and the critical sectors, in the context of cyber security.
According to the civil legal system, a role that is assigned to
a governmental authority by a law has to be elaborated with
lower level statutes. By this way, the details of the applica-
tions of the law are specified in detail.The recent amendments
to ECL have not been detailed by using lower level statutes
so far.
A second criticism is for the current mission of the Minis-
try of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. The
Ministry played a pioneering role in the coordination of the na-
tional cyber security governance thanks to its technical
sufficiency. In most of the developed countries, the govern-
mental agencies that have fundamental duties in national
security undertake the responsibility of the coordination of the
cyber security (Robinson et al., 2013). In those countries, the
agencies with technical capabilities support the agencies like
the ministry of interior or defense while specifying and ap-
plying the cyber security policies and strategies. In Turkey, the
security policies regarding cyber issues are imposed by a non-
security ministry. That practice may result in inadequacies,
duplications, and leadership problems (Ikitemur, 2014).
Table 2 summarizes six critical sectors of Turkey in terms
of ownership status, the existence of regulatory authority, and
the existence of cyber security regulations. It is seen that the
sectors that are dominated by private operators are the most
thoroughly-regulated critical sectors in Turkey. These sectors
have regulatory authorities as well. The critical sectors that are
dominated by the government have neither cyber security regu-
lations nor associated regulatory authorities. Therefore, it can
be stated that the private sector in Turkey is controlled by regu-
latory authorities in a strict manner.
The telecommunications and finance sectors have the most
complete and mature regulations for information security and
cyber security. The research showed that there was a salient
supremacy and maturity of the cyber security practices in the
finance and telecommunications sectors, compared to the other
“government-dominated” ones.
4. The research: from the data to the
regulatory approaches
The principal author participated in a project named “Infor-
mation Security Management in Critical Infrastructures”
between January 2012 and December 2013. The project
was funded by the Ministry of the Development of Turkey.
The vulnerabilities that stem from the usage of the
cyber systems in critical infrastructures were analyzed in the
project. The project showed that cyber systems were used
significantly in the energy, telecommunications, finance, gov-
ernment services, transportation, and water management
sectors in Turkey. The results of the project also demon-
strated that the critical infrastructures had significant
vulnerabilities related to the cyber systems, in spite of the
recent national efforts such as the establishment of the
Cyber Security Council and the National Computer Security
Incident Response organization.
The motivation to discover the possible root causes of the
susceptibility of the critical infrastructures to cyber threats pro-
vided the inspiration for a PhD research. The research question
was “What are the possible root causes of the susceptibility
of the critical infrastructures of Turkey to cyber threats?” The
question was answered by using a qualitative data analysis
method named grounded theory. The second research ques-
tion of the PhD was “What are the set of principles to mitigate
these root causes?”The second question was answered by con-
ducting a Delphi survey with six experts.
Ten root causes were extracted after the first phase of the
research. Forty principles were extracted after the second phase,
Delphi survey. Seven of the forty principles were directly related
to the laws and regulations. The third phase of the research
was conducted after the completion of the PhD research. At
the third phase, a focus group interview was performed with
nine employees from six critical sectors to determine the regu-
latory approaches, which are the most favorable for the
operators.The overview of the whole research process is shown
in Fig. 1.
Table 2 – The summary of critical sectors of Turkey.






Energy Government/private sector Yes Limited Delegation to
agency + negotiation
Telecommunications Private sector Yes Comprehensive Delegation to agency
Finance Private sector Yes Comprehensive Delegation to agency
Transportation Government No No -
Water management Government No No -
Government services Government No No -
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4.1. Grounded theory: determining the root causes of the
susceptibility
At the first phase of the research, the data were analyzed using
grounded theory method (GTM), an interpretive, qualitative and
inductive data analysis method. Grounded theory was pro-
posed and used by two sociologists, Glaser and Strauss in 1967.
It is the discovery of the theory through data analysis, for which
it provides a detailed, rigorous, and systematic method (Jones
and Alony, 2011; Strauss and Corbin, 2008). In GTM, the re-
searcher does not begin with a hypothesis that has to be proved
or disproved, but he begins “with an area of study and allows
the theory to emerge from the data” (Strauss and Corbin, 2008).
In GTM, the research question is a statement that identifies
the phenomenon to be studied. Grounded theory has three basic
steps.The qualitative data were rigorously coded and the codes
are categorized in the open coding step. Categories were com-
pared to find the themes in the axial coding step. Redundant,
trivial and irrelevant themes were eliminated to extract the
theory in the selective coding step.
The project data were composed of interview texts and
various kinds of documents. Data collection and interviews
were performed until theoretical saturation was attained.
Nine semi-structured interviews were performed with the
critical infrastructure owners. Interviews provided the focused,
in-depth and rich data for the phenomenon under analysis.
The interviews included open-ended questions about the
general security posture, threats, potential vulnerabilities,
applied countermeasures, and weaknesses of the inter-
viewed organization and the critical sectors. The questions
were reshaped according to the emerging categories and
themes, and they were regarded as the initiators and catalyz-
ers of the long lasting and evolving interviews.The interviewees
were mid-managers and employees of the information pro-
cessing departments.
Three hundred nine documents associated with ninety-
one different governmental or private organizations were
gathered throughout the research process. Most of these or-
ganizations were the critical infrastructure operators from the
sectors of energy, telecommunications, finance, transporta-
tion, water management and government services. There were
also documents that belonged to the regulatory authorities and
the ministries. The collected documents were classified in five
groups. These were:
a) Minutes of meeting
b) Independent evaluation report
c) Regulation text
d) Organizational report
e) News and media report
Minutes of the meeting were the notes taken during the
state-sponsored project. Performed by the independent third
parties, independent evaluation reports were information
security audit and analysis results of the critical infrastruc-
ture owners. Regulation texts were the laws and statues that
regulate the activities of critical infrastructures operators.
Regulation texts provided insight into the security views and
practices of the organizations. Organizational reports were
the documents prepared by the organizations such as annual
activity reports, annual plans, and strategic plans. Organiza-
tional reports that contained valuable information on the
cyber security perceptions of the organizations were down-
loaded from the websites of the related organizations. News
and media reports were the media excerpts related with the
critical infrastructures. The principal author collected the
news concerning the critical infrastructures of Turkey between
2011 and 2014. News and media reports included valuable
information on the threats, the opinions of the experts, and
the government officials. Minutes of meetings and indepen-
dent evaluation reports were not publicly available documents.
The other types of documents were publicly available for the
most part.
The triangulation by using different sources of data was per-
formed in this study for the internal validity of the research
(Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). Minutes of meetings, news and
media reports, and independent evaluation reports were ex-
ternal to the organization; they were prepared by the third
parties. Organizational reports and regulation texts were in-
ternal documents prepared by the organizations.
Data collection and interviews were performed in four re-
cursions until theoretical saturation was reached. Because
grounded theory method is a process of theory discovery rather
than a hypothesis testing, theoretical sampling was per-
formed between the recursions rather than between statistical
sampling (Denscombe, 2010). Using theoretical sampling, the
authors reshaped the interview questions, the interviewees,
the types of sectors and organizations, and the types of docu-
ments.The fourth recursion was the point where the theoretical
saturation occurred. At the theoretical saturation point, the in-
troduced data did not change the discovered theory (Shannak,
2009).
The authors exhibited the results of previous recursions to
the participants of the semi-structured interviewees at the next
recursion to acquire the reactions like acceptance, rejection,
Fig. 1 – Three-phased research process.
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and comments (Thai et al., 2012). The summary of the recur-
sions are shown in Table 3.
After the completion of the data analysis, ten root causes
were extracted. The root causes were verified by two cyber se-
curity experts, both of whom have master’s degrees and over
ten years of professional experience in cyber security. Expert-1
was the main organizer of the National Cyber Security Exer-
cises in Turkey; he also took part in the esta)blishment of the
National CSIRT of Turkey and directed the CSIRT for six years.
Expert-2 took part in the risk analysis projects of the govern-
mental organization and critical infrastructure owners. He took
part in the national level studies of the adoption of the inter-
nationally recognized standard into the national context. The
two experts agreed on the final list of root causes with some
changes in the wordings of some of the root causes.
1) The cyber security of critical infrastructures is not per-
ceived by national security authorities as a vital part of
national security.
2) The culture of information sharing, collaboration and co-
operation within the critical sectors and among the
sectors is very limited.
3) The private sector is not perceived by the government
and critical infrastructure operators as an important
stakeholder in national cyber security efforts.
4) The laws of public procurements and civil servants have
adverse effects on the cyber security of governmental
critical infrastructure owners.
5) The number of qualified cyber security experts is limited.
6) The relationship management practices with the product/
service providers are insufficient in governmental critical
infrastructure operators.
7) The IT audit mechanism is very limited or does not exist
in governmental critical infrastructure owners.
8) The managers of governmental critical infrastructure
owners do not perceive the information security as an
area of responsibility.
9) The methodical and formal risk management process
is not conducted by governmental critical infrastruc-
ture owners.
10) Security is considered by governmental critical infra-
structure owners as an add-on, and not as a design
construct.
The data analysis in the first phase of the research also
showed that:
1) Independent of the sectors, private organizations are more
mature compared to the governmental organizations. Most
of the extracted root causes are mainly associated with the
governmental organizations.
2) The security maturity of a sector does not mainly origi-
nate from the sectorial security practices. A governmental
operator in the finance sector had poor security practices.
A private operator in the energy sector had state-of-the art
security practices.
As a result, if a sector is dominated by private organiza-
tions, the general security posture of the sector is more mature;
or vice versa. Therefore, cyber security problems may not origi-
nate from the missing cyber security practices in certain sectors;
they may rather be associated with the type of organization
(government or private). Therefore, the organizational dynam-
ics like security culture and human factors may be more
effective for the improvement of security.
4.2. Delphi survey: determining the set of regulations
After extracting the root causes, a Delphi survey was con-
ducted by the participation of six experts. Two experts were
from the private sector with ten and fifteen years of experi-
ence in cyber security. Two experts were from a governmental
research institute with five and fourteen years of experience
in cyber security. Two experts were from the academia with
Table 3 – The details of four recursions of the first phase of the research.
First recursion Second recursion Third recursion Fourth recursion














Same question as the
previous recursion
Analyzed document types Publicly available
documents (regulation




















The number of analyzed
documents
109 76 86 38









Theory No theory discovered Discovery of a theory
(unsaturated)
Saturation of the theory
with some changes
Validation of the theory
* G: governmental organization, P: privately held organization.
532 c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 5 2 6 – 5 3 9
fifteen years of experience each. The output expected from the
survey was the agreement on the set of principles to miti-
gate the effects of the root causes.
Delphi survey was conducted by sending e-mails to six
experts separately to ensure the anonymity (Okoli and
Pawlowski, 2004).The survey had five consecutive rounds. Con-
trolled opinion feedback was supplied to the respondents
between the rounds by the authors (Hsu and Sandford, 2007).
At the first round, the detailed explanations of the ten root
causes were given to the experts. The experts were requested
to identify at least one principle for each root cause. The
answers of the experts were consolidated into a single docu-
ment and sent back to the experts at the second round. At the
second round, the experts were requested to score the prin-
ciples according to Table 4. At the next two rounds, the experts
were provided the opportunity to review and change their scores
by looking at the scores of the other experts. After the fourth
round, a significant consensus of experts on the weights of the
principles was reached. The weight values of the experts were
converged into each other, compared to the results of the second
and the third rounds. It is important to obtain the most reli-
able consensus of the opinions of the experts in Delphi surveys
(Chan et al., 2001). Therefore, only the principles, which did not
get zero point from any of the experts by the end of the fourth
round, were selected as the potential criteria of the maturity
model. Although there were fifty-eight principles with average
weights between one and three, only forty-one of them got non-
zero weights from the six experts by the end of fourth round
of Delphi survey. A final round of Delphi survey was per-
formed to obtain a final list of the principles, as some of the
principles were close in meaning. There were both some de-
tailed and general principles for the same topic. The experts
were requested to decide on whether to eliminate these prin-
ciples. The consensus of the experts was required in the
elimination of a principle, which meant a principle would be
eliminated only if all experts agreed on its elimination. As a
result, only one principle was omitted at the fifth round.There-
fore, forty principles were selected as the principles at the end
of the fifth round. Among those principles, the following list
of the principles was associated with the rules and regulations.
1) National or sectorial regulations that enforce the internal/
external audit for critical infrastructure operators
2) Obligation of a comprehensive security standard, such as
ISO 27001, for critical infrastructure owners
3) Minimum security countermeasures that are obliged by regu-
lations for critical infrastructure owners
4) Regulations that set out the properties of information
systems and security countermeasures that come into op-
eration in critical infrastructure operators
5) Regulations that specify the inner–inter sector informa-
tion sharing and cooperation principles
6) Regulations that hold top level management of critical in-
frastructure operators responsible for cyber security
7) Regulations that enforce critical infrastructure owners to
conduct the cyber security risk management process
4.3. Focus group interview: determining the regulatory
approaches
At the third phase of the research, a focus group interview is
performed with nine employees from nine different critical in-
frastructure operators in six sectors. The information on the
interviewees is shown in Table 5. Seven regulatory principles
were extracted in the previous phase of the research. The aim
of the third phase was to determine the regulatory approaches
for those principles. The definitions of the organizations at the
second column are written as generically as possible in order
not to be revealed to public.
The interviewees were different from the ones in the first
phase of the research. They were mid-managers with infor-
mation assurance responsibilities in the critical infrastructure
operators. Each interviewee was asked whether his/her
Table 4 – Reference table for the weight values of the
principles.
Score Explanation
0 The principle is unrelated.
1 The lack of the principle can be compensated by other
principles to some extent. The country improves its
critical infrastructure protection efforts more slowly
than expected.
2 The maturity principle is important on its own. The
lack of the principle cannot be compensated by other
principles. The lack of principle indicates an obvious
problem for the critical infrastructure protection.
Critical infrastructures will not be resilient at some
parts.
3 The lack of the maturity principle indicates a major
problem for the critical infrastructure protection efforts
of the country because of the dependencies of the other
principles on this principle. The country cannot
improve the cyber resilience of the critical
infrastructures.
Table 5 – Profile of interviewees.
Interviewee Critical infrastructure Operator Critical sector Type
1 Electricity distribution company Energy Public
2 Electricity production company Energy Private
3 Telecommunications company Telecommunications Public
4 GSM company Telecommunications Private
5 Bank-1 Finance Public
6 Bank-2 Finance Private
7 Transportation operator Transportation Public
8 Water purification facility within a municipality Water management Public
9 Governmental institution (provides a critical e-government service) Government services Public
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organization is regulated by each regulation, and if not, whether
he/she would like to have that regulation. If the organization
is in the effect of the similar regulation, the interviewees were
asked whether they would like any change in the regulatory
approach and which type of a regulatory approach would be
more suitable for their organization. Group members were free
to interact with each other throughout the whole interview
process.
The interviewees were selected by convenience sampling.
The researcher contacted with the interviewees who were con-
veniently accessible rather than barely reachable ones (Marshall,
1996).
The first question directed to each interviewee was “How
do you see the maturity of your organization’s security prac-
tices based on the maturity levels of Capability Maturity Model
Integration (CMMI) framework?” The definitions of five CMMI
maturity levels are shown in Table 6 (Ahem et al., 2008).
Some of the selected security processes of each critical in-
frastructure operator are assessed in the light of the CMMI
framework. The maturity levels of each operator in Table 7 is
agreed upon both by the authors and interviewees.
5. Findings and discussions
One of the findings in the first phase of the research was the
higher maturity level of the private critical infrastructure op-
erators in terms of cyber security, compared to the
governmental operators. That finding corroborates the matu-
rity values in Table 7. Most of the extracted root causes were
mainly associated with the governmental organizations. As an
example, during the interviews at the third phase of the re-
search, two interviewees from the finance sector (one from the
public, the other from the private sector) pointed out that private
banks take the security issues more seriously than the public
banks.
Table 8 shows the mapping of the security principles and
sectors by taking the enacted regulations into account.
Checkmarks in the cells mean the partial or full existence of
a related regulation in the corresponding sector. In terms of
extracted principles, government services, transportation, and
water management sectors do not have any cyber security
related regulations in effect. Energy, telecommunications, and
finance sectors have regulations that enforce the adoption of
ISO 27001 or a customized national standard. Risk manage-
ment process is obliged for those three sectors by the
aforementioned standards.The telecommunications and finance
sectors have regulations that describe the processes of inter-
nal and external security audits in detail. Management
responsibility is also specified by the regulations of those two
sectors. The telecommunications sector has regulations that
specify the details of required security countermeasures and
properties of the information systems that should be set up
by the operators. None of the sectors have regulations or rules
that specify the aspects like information sharing and cooperation.
As the prominent result of the focus group interview,
interviewees generally support the regulations. Some sample
expressions of the interviewees are as follows:
1) “Information security is not a foremost criterion for our cus-
tomers. Security is one of the low priority criteria for our
customers in selecting the bank. Therefore, market itself
cannot promote security” (Bank-2)
2) “Regulations discipline us. For example, periodical exter-
nal audit processes enforced by the regulations keep us up-
to-date in terms of security” (Telecommunications company)
3) “We have to customize several information security stan-
dards according to our needs. Then, these standards have
to be obliged by directives and guidelines to the critical or-
ganizations.” (Governmental institution)
4) “Information security is not an agenda item of the general
manager of the organization. First thing to do is to set due
care principles by regulations for the managers” (Transpor-
tation operator)
5) “The usability and security has to be stabilized together. One
cannot be sacrificed for the other. That could be done best
by a governmental regulatory agency” (GSM company)
6) “Relevant governmental bodies such as Ministry of Trans-
port, Maritime Affairs and Communications or Cyber Security
Council do not take the lead in cyber security issues; they
should specify and enact what we should do in cyber se-
curity. We need that guidance” (Water management)
The opinions of the interviewees are summarized in Table 9.
Regulations are considered as an important gadget for the im-
provement in security. In case of the lack of regulations,
interviewees said that they felt they lacked the necessary
Table 6 – Maturity reference table.
Level Maturity definition
1 Initial – processes unpredictable, poorly
controlled and reactive.
2 Managed – processes characterized for projects
and is often reactive.
3 Defined – processes characterized for the
organization and is proactive.
4 Quantitatively managed – processes measured
and controlled.
5 Optimized – focus on process improvement.
Table 7 – Maturity levels of the critical infrastructure
operators.
Critical infrastructure operator Answer of
the interviewees
Electricity distribution company 2






Water purification facility within a
municipality
2
Governmental institution (provides a
critical e-government service)
3
The average of public critical
infrastructure operators
2.83
The average of private critical
infrastructure operators
5
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guidance. However, two regulatory approaches are clustered
after the focus group interview. The first group contains the
critical infrastructure operators with a maturity level of less
than 3 according to the Table 7. The second group includes the
operators with the maturity levels 4 or 5. The first group sup-
ports government or regulatory agency provision. None of the
interviewees in the first group was from the private sector. In
Turkey, government services, transportation, and water man-
agement sectors do not have regulatory agencies. They think
that government (relevant ministry and cyber security council)
should take the lead in the determination of the required regu-
lations. The regulations should be detailed so that they should
know what to do. The first group also points out the impor-
tance of the regulations for the due care of the managers. They
strongly point out that regulations make the managers allo-
cate sufficient budget and manpower to the required cyber
security tasks. The second group contains three private and
two public operators. The second group also supports the regu-
lations. However, their main focus is the cooperation of the
operators in market and the government in the specification
of the set of regulations. Although private operators espe-
cially would like to be more active in specifying regulations,
the current situation in Turkey for these operators is still close
to government provision.That means there is no or very limited
cooperation between the operators and the government in de-
termining or updating the regulations. That current situation
is not what a second group would like to see.
Table 10 shows the ideas of the interviewees on the neces-
sity of each regulation that was identified in the second phase
of the research. All interviewees support the regulations that
arrange the rules on the audit process, security standards, the
properties of information system, risk management, and the
top management responsibilities. Only four of the interviewees
support the regulations that specify information sharing and
cooperation rules. Interviewees who support the regulations
for information sharing and cooperation claim that regula-
tions are the enablers of the information sharing and
cooperation activities. Interviewees who oppose the regula-
tions stress that the incentives like cooperation, innovation,
information sharing, and security culture cannot be acquired
through regulations. They underline that all parties in coop-
eration should be voluntary and they should satisfy the
requirements of cooperation and information sharing.
The policy-level issues of critical infrastructure protection
as an academic topic is mostly studied in developed coun-
tries like the United States, European Union and Oceanian
countries. In terms of developing policies and strategies, the
governments of the developed countries are ahead of the gov-
ernments of the less developed ones. Secondly, critical
infrastructures are mostly owned and operated by private en-
tities in developed countries. For example, the percentage of
private sector ownership of infrastructures in the US is eighty-
five percent (de Bruijne and van Eeten, 2007).
Developing countries like Turkey are mostly under way to
privatize the infrastructures. For example, the largest and na-
tional telecommunications company of Turkey was privatized
in 2005 (Turk Telekom, 2015). Share transfer agreements
between the government and private organizations that are
responsible for electricity distribution were completed as of
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there is still a considerable dominance of the government own-
ership of the critical infrastructures in Turkey.
The regulation of critical infrastructures has been dis-
cussed for at least one decade. However, it is still a hot topic
for the academia and the governments. The strict govern-
ment intervention and regulations in CIP efforts are not
considered as a suitable option by the academia and govern-
ments in the developed countries. In these countries, there are
a number of academic studies that propose security manage-
ment models for CIP. These articles focus on the importance
of the cooperation, innovation, and non-regulation rather than
emphasize the importance of the regulations. The idea of non-
regulation is accepted more widely in the developed countries.
Although the developed world discusses the topics like in-
novation, non-regulation, business continuity, voluntary
approaches, and network governance, developing countries like
Turkey should be prudent while considering these options. As
opposed to the developed world, the approaches close to the
deregulation of the infrastructures may not be a sound option
to establish effective CIP policies for the developing coun-
tries like Turkey. The opinions of the employees at the third
phase of the research corroborate the situation.
The main problem of Turkey can be regarded as the
normlessness or deregulation of the certain sectors like trans-
portation, water management, and government services. As
most of the employees in the focus group interview empha-
sized, written regulations can be considered as imperatives to
ensure an acceptable level of cyber security practices within
the critical sectors.
6. Assumptions, limitations and
delimitations
The limitations and assumptions of a typical qualitative re-
search also apply for this research. It is assumed that
interviewees and experts have responded accurately during the
interviews, the verification of the extracted theory, and Delphi
survey. Extracted from the data by using grounded theory
method, the root causes are bound by the opinions of the
interviewees, the gathered documents, and the theoretical sen-
sitivity of the authors. The set of principles are depended on
the opinions of the experts who have participated in Delphi
survey. There were nine interviewees from six different sectors
in the first phase of the research. Six experts were utilized in
the Delphi survey. Nine participants were incorporated in the
focus group interview. Authors succeeded the participation of
the experienced employees and experts from divert sectors,
so that subjectivity of the qualitative research is lessened.
For this study, the critical infrastructure sectors, deter-
mined in the second meeting of the Cyber Security Council of
Turkey, are selected as the critical sectors.The analyses are per-
formed by using the gathered data from these sectors, which
are energy, telecommunications, finance, transportation, water
management, and government services.
As the disciplines of cyber crime fighting, military cyber op-
erations and privacy protection are not directly associated with
the cyber security of critical infrastructures (Klimburg, 2012),
they are left out of the scope of the research. The vulnerabili-
ties associated with the physical security of the critical
infrastructures are left out of the scope of the research.
The interviewees might have avoided giving correct and
complete information as not to be responsible for disclosing
problems and vulnerabilities. At the beginning of each inter-
view, it was assured that the interviewee and his/her
organization would remain anonymous and any vulnerabil-
ity that may be associated with the organization would not be
mentioned within the research. Conducting interviews with nine
different organizations from six sectors can be a mitigating
factor for this threat.
7. Future research implications
Private sector domination is an important factor for the debates
of “regulation versus innovation” in developed countries. Cur-
rently, there are no, or very limited, disputes in Turkey on the
intervention of the government in the critical infrastructure
protection, contrary to the developed countries. Although there
are critical sectors that are dominated by private organiza-
tions, all of the participants of the focus group interview,
including the private-sector ones, supported the regulations.
Three factors may result in, or contribute to, this phenom-
enon. Firstly, there is still a considerable weight of governmental
critical infrastructure owners in Turkey. If the proportion of the
private sector ownership increases as a result of the privati-
zation and globalization processes in the forthcoming years,
some disputes on government intervention may emerge.
Table 9 – Summary of the thoughts of the interviewees.
Critical infrastructure operator Type Regulation is
necessary?
Regulatory approach
Electricity distribution company Public Yes Regulatory agency provision
Electricity production company Private Yes Regulatory agency and market should
specify the required regulations together.Telecommunications company Public Yes
GSM company Private Yes
Bank-1 Public Yes
Bank-2 Private Yes
Transportation operator Public Yes Government provision
Water purification facility within a municipality Public Yes Government provision
Governmental institution (provides a critical
e-government service)
Public Yes Government provision
536 c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 5 2 6 – 5 3 9
Table 10 – Opinions of the interviewees on the necessity of the principles.
















1. National or sectorial regulations
that enforce the internal/external
audit for critical infrastructure
operators
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
2. Obligation of a comprehensive
security standard, such as ISO
27001, for critical infrastructure
owners
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
3. Minimum security
countermeasures that are obliged
by regulations for critical
infrastructure owners
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
4. Regulations that set out the
properties of information systems
and security countermeasures that
come into operation in critical
infrastructure operators
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
5. Regulations that specify the inner–
inter sector information sharing
and cooperation principles
✓ X X X X X ✓ ✓ ✓




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
7. Regulations that enforce critical
infrastructure owners to conduct
the cyber security risk management
process
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓








































Secondly, Turkey has a civil legal system unlike the US and the
Commonwealth Countries that have common legal system. In
civil legal systems; the rules have to be in written forms, which
are structured in a hierarchy of norms. Therefore, because of
its legal system, a well-defined and complete set of regula-
tions may be necessary for Turkey. Thirdly, the innovation
capacity of Turkey is quite low compared to the developed coun-
tries (OECD, 2012). Therefore, the private sector may not focus
on the innovations at least at the first place.
Our study confirmed that there is no one solution that fits
all the situations in terms of cyber security regulations of criti-
cal infrastructures.A new research will be conducted to find the
possible reasons of supporting the regulations for the security
of the critical infrastructures. The authors of the article con-
sider that the factors such as critical infrastructure ownership
by governmental organizations, judicial system and innova-
tion capacity of a country may be prominent factors. However
a new research is required to ensure the effects of those three
and any other factors. The results of the future research may
help the countries that resemble Turkey in terms of develop-
ment level, legal system and critical infrastructure ownerships.
If a similar research is performed in other developing coun-
tries, a cross-country comparison can be made and the lessons
learned may be more beneficial to other countries when cre-
ating awareness for securing critical infrastructures.
Acknowledgements
The data of the project named “Information Security Manage-
ment of Critical Infrastructures” are used at this research. The
project is funded by the Ministry of Development of Turkey with
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